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Abstract 
This paper contributes to discussions surrounding interest group representation in the European 
Parliament (EP). Different types of procedures effect committees’ demands for legitimacy, impacting 
the balance of private and public interests. We inspect a population of 10,000 accredited lobbyists, and 
the entire procedural output across the 7th legislature’s (2009-2014) committees. The results indicate 
that committees with a higher ratio of Ordinary Legislative Procedures to Own Initiative Reports see 
greater numbers of private interests involved. However, in committees where the procedures’ ratios 
are inverse we observe greater numbers of public interests involved. While this may overturn the 
premise of business dominance across the Institution. It has implications regarding the balanced 
representation of public and private interests on a procedural level. The paper offers a novel approach 
for framing the nature of the committee, whilst bridging discussions on interest group representation 
and the democratic deficit. 
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 1 
Introduction 
Studies on interest group mobilization offer key insights into policymaking by mirroring institutions’ 
locus of activity, power and bias (see Richardson 2015). To comprehend the nature of the European 
Parliament’s (EP) growing authority and the role of its committees in the policy process, it is 
important that we examine the diversity of interest mobilization in this black box. Significantly, we 
need to take account of the delegation of powers since the Lisbon Treaty, and the creeping 
competencies that go beyond legislative procedures (Héritier & Reh 2012). We argue that the mix of 
procedures that committees engage in shapes their authority and their corresponding demands for 
legitimacy, impacting the types of interest groups that mobilize around them. We accept that a group’s 
organizational structure, and its public or private character, determines the legitimacy (input or output) 
that it carries to the decision-making process.  
Under procedures where the EP has (co-) legislating power it takes on a scrutinizing role, 
amending Commission initiatives often associated with the regulation and integration of the common 
market. Consequently, the parliament’s authority rests on the legitimacy of its output, linked to the 
effectiveness of the legislation rather than the inclusiveness of the process. This pushes the EP to 
consult with greater numbers of private interests as it governs ‘for the people’.  
By contrast, under procedures where it has the political initiative the parliament tries to be 
responsive to the demands of its constituency by raising popular issues on the EU’s agenda. In this 
case, its authority becomes dependent on its input legitimacy, as the EP aspires to govern ‘with the 
people’ – swelling the presence of public interest groups (see Bellamy 2010; Schaprf 1998; Schmidt 
2004). Therefore, the mobilization of private and public interests in each committee follows the 
balance of its legislative and political procedures. 
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it examines the diversity of interest 
group mobilization across the EP’s committees, introducing a unique snapshot of a population of 
10,000 accredited lobbyists, altering notions of systemic business dominance. Second, following an 
analysis of the 7th legislature’s procedures, it uncovers a significant body of parliamentary initiatives 
that expand the EP’s role beyond legislating. Finally, it offers an innovative use of conceptualizations 
of legitimacy for modelling interest group diversity across sub-systems. 
 
Hurdles in Conceptualizing Interest Group Diversity 
In an ever-more integrated EU polity, the various decision-making functions cut across interconnected 
institutional structures, tangling the various actors and resources mobilized. As a result, traditional 
conceptual vehicles face limitations in explaining interest group diversity within sub-systems (Marks 
& Hooghe 2009) – thought of as policy fields, committees or Directorate Generals.  
On the one hand, a single committee can take on seemingly contrasting traits, such as 
economic and democratic (Bouwen 2004; Crombez 2002), regulatory and distributive or technical and 
political (Broscheid & Coen 2007). This dynamic restricts the validity of modelling interest group 
diversity within sub-systems by assigning specific issue-traits: each of these traits, taken on by a 
committee, will attract a different community of interest groups.  On the other hand, the evolving 
strategic behaviour of interest groups reduces the validity of attributing information or expertise 
monopolies to types of groups. The links that tie NGOs to political expertise and business to technical 
expertise are fading (Coen & Katsaitis 2015 p.65), challenging a standard practice of modelling sub-
system interest group diversity based on the information-expertise streams passing through them. 
Moreover, work on interest group mobilization within the EP specifically has expanded over 
the past 10 years, moving down to the committee level; yet it is still focussed on legislative 
procedures. This oversimplifies the function of the parliament, which utilizes various procedures 
across its committees which in turn impact its institutional behaviour (Naurin & Rasmussen 2011). 
Thus, the above mentioned conceptual limitations continue to be implemented on a fraction of the 
procedures employed by the parliament’s decision makers, bounding our understanding of 
committees’ policymaking activity and its reflection on the mobilization of lobbying. 
David Coen and Alexander Katsaitis 
2 Max Weber Programme Working Papers 
Mechanisms seeking to frame the nature of the sub-system (or committee) and its impact on 
interest group diversity, could alternatively concentrate on the distinct building blocks that construct it, 
hitting two birds with one stone. Procedures are legal or constitutional expressions of institutional 
competences; well-defined tools serving diverse functions that ultimately can be translated into forms 
of authority. While the impact of authority on interest group diversity has been modelled through 
conceptualizations of legitimacy at the institutional level; it remains to be applied at the sub-system 
level. Aiming to sort interest group diversity across the EP’s committees, we argue that their 
procedural output offers an elegant framing device. Moving towards this direction would broaden our 
understanding of interest group diversity with respect to a richer spectrum of the EP’s functions. In the 
next section, we describe how legitimacy can model variations of authority across procedures, discuss 
their effect on the nature of committees and explore how this impacts interest group diversity.  
 
Legitimacy, Interest Group Diversity & EP Procedures 
Drawing from legitimacy theory, institutional authority can stem from input or output legitimacy, 
depending on the form of authority delegated. Institutional actors demand and instigate the 
mobilization of interest groups to access the legitimacy they carry, as a way of retaining their authority 
(Schmidt 2004).  Interest groups carry legitimacy that is input or output oriented, connected to their 
organizational structure. They aim to represent their members by mobilizing to monitor and influence 
policy, transferring their legitimacy through different informational channels, such as the formal or 
informal approval of amendments or the direct supply of expertise or opinions. 
Input legitimacy is defined as the acknowledgement of authority in the context of the breadth 
of the decision-making process and its responsiveness to the beliefs and debates of a community (Zürn 
et al. 2012); it is rooted in notions of governing with the people. Under input dependent systems, 
“decisions should originate from the authentic expression of the preferences of the constituency” 
(Scharpf 1998 p.2). These systems have strong democratic credentials and work better for decision-
making systems with a broad implementation; for example, parliamentary elections.  
Output legitimacy is defined as the acknowledgement of the quality of a decision made or 
output produced in the context of the technical standards of a community (Bellamy 2010); it is rooted 
in notions of governing for the people (see Schmidt 2004). Collectively binding decisions should serve 
the common interest of the constituency. “…the powers of government can be employed to deal with 
those problems that the members of the collectivity cannot solve either individually, or through market 
interactions, or through voluntary cooperation.” (Scharpf 1998 p3). Thus, output legitimacy is of 
higher relevance in decision-making systems entrusted with scrutinising decisions or upholding 
standards, for example the European Court of Justice.   
Public interest groups such as civil society organizations (CSOs) represent grassroots 
movements and interests that are part of the public domain, incentivized by public support expressed 
through registered members. Acting as norm entrepreneurs that by default politicize the subject of 
their lobbying, they are guided by the breadth and participatory character of the decision-making 
process and therefore the legitimacy they carry is input oriented. By contrast, private groups such as 
businesses or trade associations represent owners and shareholders. They are incentivized by results 
reflected in maximizing profit, or in increasing market share, and are guided by the standards of the 
decision rather than the inclusiveness of the process; the legitimacy they carry is output oriented1.  
We argue that the EP operates with a different authority setting, under different procedures, 
that influences the prominence of different types of legitimacy within its committees. This ultimately 
affects the diversity of the mobilized population2. We focus on two distinct procedures that cover 
approximately 70% of the total output of the 7th legislature. 
 
                                                      
1 We note that this dichotomy is not exclusionary. As some NGOs may also be associated with output legitimacy and vice-
versa for business interests.  
2 We reiterate that this paper is looking at diversity of mobilization and not diversity of influence.  
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OLP, Output Legitimacy & Private Interest Groups  
Files under the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) are the only case where the EP acts on equal 
terms with the Council of the EU on initiatives of the Commission. Under such legislative initiatives, 
the Commission is charged with producing proposals independently limiting its need for input 
legitimacy. The relevance of its authority is linked to the quality of the policy output, rather than the 
inclusiveness of beliefs and ideas in the decision-making process (Neyer 2010; Majone 2002). 
Similarly, while the Council consists of national governments’ ministers, hence it also produces its 
resolutions behind closed doors, associating the relevance of its authority with the legitimacy of the 
legislative product (Heisenberg 2005). For both institutions, the authority they are delegated under 
OLP is one in which they govern for the people.  
As the only EU institution held directly accountable via elections, the EP must influence 
legislative outcomes in ways that represent and respond to the ideas and beliefs of its constituents to 
prove its relevance to the electorate. However, under OLP the parliament finds itself with an oversight 
role that limits the value of input legitimacy. To achieve influence, amendments must speak the 
language of the Commission and the Council to be considered in the decision-making process (Reh et 
al. 2013; Burns et al. 2013). Amendments that harm the quality of the output, or in any way delay the 
legislative process, can lead to the Commission and Council side-lining the parliament in future 
legislative initiatives by utilizing other procedures. Therefore, the EP takes care when framing its 
amendments and argumentation to focus on their output legitimacy, and this has the effect of 
instigating the mobilization of private interests rather than expanding the involvement of public 
interests.  
Committee meetings that take place before trialogues exacerbate this effect. MEPs are handed 
unique powers of representation as they try to modify proposals through amendments, point by point, 
focusing on the legislative output, rather than inclusiveness, which could stall the process or lead to a 
legislative gridlock (see Benedetto 2005; Crombez & Hix 2015). In the 7th legislature, 80% of all OLP 
files were passed at first reading or early second reading, suggesting a high degree of informal 
agreement between the three institutions before formal discussion of the legislative proposal within the 
relevant EP committee (Burns et al. 2013).  
Therefore, for files under OLP the EP’s authority is associated with governing for the people, 
making input legitimacy less valuable in comparison to output legitimacy. As such, output legitimacy 
oriented private interests are incentivized to mobilize more than input oriented public groups. Under 
OLP procedures there should be a greater mobilization of business interests than public interests. 
 
INI, Input Legitimacy & Public Interest Groups 
Own Initiative Reports (INI) fall under the category of resolutions & initiatives procedures. Files 
under this procedure permit the EP’s committees to produce a resolution that addresses a specific issue 
and proposes solutions on their own initiative. Similar to a legislative file, the report is written by a 
rapporteur, debated, amended and voted at the committee level, and afterwards sent for confirmation 
at the plenary. Once adopted an INI is a formal resolution produced solely by the EP, but it does not 
have a binding character for EU policy. Moreover, INIs can address smaller constituencies than the 
Commission’s, as MEPs aim to show to their electorate that they represent their interests. The value of 
the initiative rests in the accurate representation and inclusiveness of beliefs, norms and issues 
addressed. Under INIs the EP operates within a frame of governing with the people.  
Thus, INIs serve as a tool for MEPs and political groups, through which they can politicize 
issues that affect their constituencies and attempt to place them on the EU agenda (see Zürn 2016 for a 
conceptual discussion on politicization). Conversely, MEPs can divert a public backlash and political 
costs from unpopular areas of EU policy towards other institutions by producing INIs, as counter-
resolutions to wash their hands clean in the eyes of (at least sections of) the electorate3. Significantly, 
INIs do not need to be adopted but can be used to make an argument that benefits MEPs or parties. 
While vetoing a legislative proposal may be considered an institutional failure, and may entail inter-
                                                      
3 For example reports on austerity measures conducted under INIs. 
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institutional retribution, INIs do not carry such harsh punishment for the committee which tabled 
them. 
At the same time, the EP discreetly attempts to override the Commission’s monopoly of 
legislative initiative by capitalizing on publicly salient and highly politicized issues that offer an 
opportunity for legislative action, by moving them on to the EU level. Inviting already mobilized 
public interests within the EP’s institutional setting adds to the legitimacy of such moves. Through 
reports in areas such as EU transparency, funding for regional projects or genetically modified foods, 
the EP can signal to its institutional counterparts (the Commission in particular) potential areas of 
legislative activity without openly contesting them or risking direct rejection4.  
INIs give the EP a distinct political function, highlighting its input oriented decision-making 
nature.  MEPs aim to produce resolutions that express as much as possible the original demands of 
their constituency. Therefore, under INIs the relevance of input legitimacy is higher than output 
legitimacy, which leads to a greater mobilization of public interests. In the following section, we 
provide the hypotheses that frame our argumentation, and the methodology for examining them. 
 
Hypotheses, Methodology & Data Collection 
Any EP committee can function under a different type of authority depending on the procedure it 
engages with, resulting in the relevance of different types of legitimacy to different circumstances. 
Because interest groups’ organizational structure affects the legitimacy they carry, the types of group 
mobilizing across committees are a result of the mix of the committees’ procedural output. If a 
committee engages in more OLP procedures than INI, then there should be a greater mobilization of 
private over public interests. Conversely, if a committee engages in more INI than OLP procedures, 
then there should be a greater mobilization of public over private interests.  
H1: If a committee utilizes more OLP than INI files we will observe greater mobilization 
of business interests over public interests. . 
H2: If a committee utilizes more INI than OLP files we will observe a greater 
mobilization of public interests over business interests. . 
Our theoretical framework attempts to model overall patterns of behaviour across committees 
of the EP. We have therefore taken a quantitative approach that aims to test the validity of our 
argumentation while offering reliable replications. To test our hypotheses we gathered secondary data 
on procedures and interest group mobilization, across the committees of the EP’s 7th legislature. 
Interest groups that aim to mobilize within the EP on a permanent basis apply for an accreditation that 
allows them to enter the institution at opening time without having to register at reception. 
Accreditations are valid for one year and apply to specific individuals per interest group; that is, they 
are non-transferable. Interest groups are classified under one of six categories: professional 
consultancies / law firms / self-employed consultants; companies’ in-house lobbyists and trade / 
professional associations; non-governmental organisations; organisations representing churches and 
religious communities; organisations representing local, regional and municipal authorities, other 
public or mixed entities, etc.; think tanks, research and academic institutions.  
We focus on accredited individuals for two reasons. First, through accreditations we can 
safely infer at least a minimum of mobilization in the EP: accredited individuals are definitely 
interested in conducting lobbying activity and mobilize within the EP by applying for the permit. 
Second, accredited individuals are required to specify upon registration the committees of interest, 
they aim to lobby. The data was collected as part of a broader research project on interest groups and 
covers the entire population of accreditations from mid-2012 to mid-2014, approximately 10,000 
lobbyists, and provides information on their committees of interest and the type of interest group they 
belong to. This variable better operationalizes interest mobilization across committees, as a specific 
group may place more than one accredited individual per committee. Conversely, the same accredited 
individuals may operate on more than one committee. As such, the quality and quantity of 
mobilization per type of organization is well captured. The population of lobbyists provided a total of 
                                                      
4 The EP can also use Legislative Initiative (INL) to invite the Commission to submit a proposal, however this is a much rarer 
case and the Commission is not obliged to fulfil this request. 
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24,225 indications of committee interest, approximately 2.4 committees per lobbyist. This allows us to 
observe the extent of lobbying mobilization per type of organisation across the 20 committees of the 
7th legislature (2009-2014).  
Operationalizing the types of interests, we utilize categories of groups that are easy to classify 
clearly, either in the private or public area of interests. For private interests (such as companies and 
trade or economic associations) we utilize data on those categories as ‘in-house lobbyists’; while for 
public interests we utilize data on NGO groups (or civil society organisations) and regional and local 
authorities. We are confident of the sample we focus on for our analysis, which represents 
approximately 78% (18,919) of all data points of committee interest of our population. We excluded 
from our analysis the remaining categories as their role is harder to classify, and they also represent a 
considerably smaller percentage of the interest group population. We note that professional 
consultancies – the 3rd largest group of accredited individuals (18% of all data points) within the EP – 
are hired professionals that act as mediators for their clients. However, less is known about who 
precisely they work for on a per file basis. As such we cannot validly assign them to either the private 
or public area, as their legitimacy is tied to the client they represent per case.5  
We collected information on the procedural output per committee of the EP using its online 
archive. Out of a total of 19 different procedures that fall under 5 different categories, we excluded the 
category of internal organization procedures, which are not relevant to our analysis, as the EP utilizes 
them for internal communication (they are very few). We created a data set with the entire output per 
committee across the remaining 16 procedures that fell under 4 categories: legislative, non-legislative, 
budgetary and discharge, and resolutions & initiatives. We then proceeded to exclude types of 
procedures that contained no files or very few files, leaving us with 9 types of procedures (12,081 files 
/ data points)6. Our analysis focuses on files under INI and OLP that cover nearly 70% (8,348) of the 
total output of committees.  
We do not address other legislative files because OLP is the only procedure that gives the EP 
the ability to scrutinize legislation, co-legislating along with the Council of the EU with the nuclear 
option of vetoing policy. Other types of legislative procedures (e.g. Consultation Procedure, CNS) 
give the EP a consulting role with an ability to somewhat delay procedures. We do not address 
budgetary and discharge procedures, which between them cover 17% of the total procedures. Two 
committees engage with the majority of these specific procedures, the Budget Committee and the 
Budgetary Control Committee, and they receive little interest group mobilization because of their 
limited power to impact budgets that are created by the Commission and the Court of Auditors. 
Finally, we recognize that in an ideal case there would be information linking explicitly specific 
interests mobilized per file-procedure, however such information is unavailable in the EU, and in most 
interest group data bases around the world (OECD 2014). Nevertheless, as this paper identifies and 
theoretically frames overall patterns of behaviour based on the procedural mix of the committee, 
future case-study work can clarify its mechanisms, leading to a better understanding of how different 
functions of authority per file-procedure impact interest group diversity. We provide a detailed table 
with all our data in the appendix. In the next section, we present our results and analysis.  
 
Results & Analysis 
To examine the relationship between the variables, we utilize a Pearson’s product-moment correlation. 
This gives us a measure of the strength between the procedures examined (OLP and INI), and the 
types of interest groups (public and private), allowing us to test the hypotheses. The results lend 
support to the theoretical argument: OLP files have a much stronger correlation with private than with 
public groups. Conversely, INI files show a stronger correlation with public rather than with private 
groups, that is statistically significant. We observe with smaller statistical significance but at 
reasonable levels, that public interests show a weaker correlation to OLP files while private groups 
                                                      
5 We note that future work on EU lobbying and mobilization could benefit considerably by an empirical analysis untangling 
the role this specific category of lobbyists play in EU policymaking. 
6 For a detailed descriptive breakdown of files per procedure and interest groups mobilized across committees please refer to 
Coen & Katsaitis 2015. 
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also show a correlation with INI files. This is not surprising: files are multi-faceted, which may lead to 
the mobilization of other types of groups as well but at a much smaller rate. After all, MEPs have 
private interests, as part of their constituencies, which they need to represent, justifying their 
mobilization in INIs; older and highly professionalized NGOs that have achieved insider status may be 
invited to participate in OLP negotiations. Similarly, we also note the correlation between private and 
public interest groups. This can be explained as a result of issue overlap; public and private interest 
groups may mobilize under common themes within committees as they offer different forms of 
legitimacy for a common issue i.e. environmental protection.  The overall patterns of behaviour that 
this paper seeks to identify fit within the theoretical and empirical frame set. 
 
Table 1: Correlations Coefficients 
 
 OLP INI PRIVATE PUBLIC 
OLP 1 .292 .680 .396 
 (.212) (.001) (.084) 
INI .292 1 .427 .704 
(.212)  (.060) (.001) 
PRIVATE .680 .427 1 .590 
(.001) (.060)  (.006) 
PUBLIC  .396 .704 .590 1 
 (.084) (.001) (.006)  
*p values in parentheses N=20 
 
Based on the above and following from the premises of the argument, the diversity of the population 
across committees is a result their procedural output-mix. Thus, if our conceptualization holds when 
the number of OLP files in relation to INI files is greater, the number of private interests will be 
greater than public interests. Conversely, if the number of INI files in relation to OLP files is greater, 
then the number of public interests will be greater than private interests. Put more simply, we can also 
think of this relationship in terms of ratios: if the ratio of OLP to INI files is greater, then the ratio of 
private interests to public interests will be greater, and vice versa. We plotted the results from smaller 
procedural ratio to largest (Figure 1). It should be noted that the ratios do not mean that committees 
are necessarily densely populated or that they have greater procedural output; they give a 
quantification of the relative relationship between the procedural activity and interest group activity.  
We observe a division between committees that have greater relative INI procedural output 
(where OLP/ INI<1) public interests are mobilized in greater numbers than private interests. 
Meanwhile in committees that have greater relative OLP output (where OLP/ INI ≥1), we observe a 
greater mobilization of private interests. As MEPs aim to politicize resolutions or address politicized 
issues through INIs they demand input legitimacy supplied primarily by public interests. This confirms 
that a formal role for public interests in the EP exists and that it is also dominant within specific 
committees (Rasmussen M. 2016). Nevertheless, as the balance of the procedural ratio shifts from INI 
towards OLP files and output legitimacy becomes more relevant, private interests mobilize and their 
dominance over public interests is considerably greater. This can be explained by resource-
mobilization arguments, as business groups are better equipped to mobilize with more financial and 
staff resources; when they are incentivized to mobilize they do so in great numbers. This seems only to 
intensify the effect of the procedural function, and the overall effect observed is that OLP files create 
an environment that sees public interest mobilization overshadowed by private interests. 
Substantively, these results raise normative questions surrounding the parliament’s limited 
comparative initiative in these committees and the balance of public interest representation in the 
policy process within them, which we address in the following section.  
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Figure 1: Comparison between procedural (OLP: INI) and interest group mobilization 
(Private: Public Interests), across committees. 
 
 
 
The exceptions across the population of 20 committees are LIBE (Civil Liberties Justice & Home 
Affairs), and PECH (Fisheries) and BUDG (Budgetary). LIBE is the only of the three committees that 
has a substantial capacity to impact interests across the EU, and is renowned for representing diffuse 
interests on highly politicized subjects, such as surveillance and online data protection. Thus, LIBE 
might be experiencing the focus of diffuse interests across the board, which perceive it as an access 
committee into the policymaking process – surpassing the mobilization of private interests. The 
Budgetary and Fisheries committees are both particular cases because they offer little in terms of EU 
wide policy impact. BUDG confirms budgets prepared by the Commission and the Court of Auditors 
with only a small capacity to impact them, and largely produces a specific type of output under 
budgetary and discharge procedures, rather than OLP files. Similarly, PECH sets fishing quotas 
discussed between the Commission and Council but not all member states are directly interested. Their 
limited impact on policy in terms of implementation and constituency size reduces their need for 
output legitimacy to remain relevant, artificially increasing the demand for input legitimacy and public 
interest mobilization.  Overall, the results confirm that interest group diversity observed across 
committees is driven by the mix of external and internal procedural initiatives that vary in terms of the 
authority. In the next section, we discuss the implications of these results. 
 
Implications 
This paper identifies a distinct link between specific types of interest group and procedures, noting a 
two-fold mobilization bias at play. Private interests dominate in committees that engage in more 
legislative procedures, and public interests are more active in committees that engage in more political 
procedures. One central issue that derives from this is that while parliaments often exercise a useful 
scrutiny function it can only be effective if they can draw on different sources of expertise compared 
to the executive. That is to say, if both the EP and the Commission are listening to the same people, 
then how can the parliament exercise control? This highlights that the risk of institutional capture by 
private interests cannot be contained within the Commission but is likely to spill over to the 
parliament. Moreover, if we assume that a balanced distribution of private and public groups, input 
and output legitimacy, is necessary to better weigh the overall quality of policy, private interests are 
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advantaged over public interests because of the legislative nature of the procedures where their 
mobilization is greater; the bigger the difference between the ratios of groups the greater the 
imbalance.  This underscores an issue with the legislative supremacy of the Commission and the EP’s 
limitations in impacting policy proposals. The parliament gets to scrutinize and impact the legislative 
file under a similar authority / legitimacy setting; this leaves public interest mobilization for cases of a 
red flag in a specific designated committee (LIBE).  
This paper quantifies representation-accountability issues identified under OLP (Andlovic & 
Lehman 2013; see also Mazey & Richardson 2015), in terms of public versus private interest 
mobilization. Because the EP is a consensual parliament that represents a broad European electorate 
with multiple small constituencies, its committees attempt to balance their work with input 
considerations. However, this needs to be done by closing the gap between forms of governing within 
procedures, primarily in OLP files where governing for the people is overemphasized. Attempting to 
close the gap between private and public interest mobilization artificially through INIs cannot resolve 
issues of limited public engagement in legislative procedures. The lack of politicization of the 
legislative process through public interest mobilization remains. Therefore, from a normative 
perspective, one of the questions that arises is whether the parliament should attempt actively to 
instigate the mobilization of public interests where it is limited, or comparatively speaking let private 
interests dominate? As a directly elected institution, charged with bringing citizens closer to the 
policymaking process, not actively doing so may ultimately place its own legitimacy and relevance in 
question – and risks the legitimacy of the entire system (see Kochler-Koch 2010; Eriksen & Fossum 
2011). A potential additional solution to this issue would be to expand the EP’s capacity to conduct 
independent research through its research service in order to limit its need for information-expertise 
from interest groups. While the relatively new EPRS has been added to its abilities, along with the 
policy department and the impact assessment unit, the EP is far from the size of the US Congressional 
research service. 
Procedural initiative has an impact on lobbyists within the EP and it may have an impact on 
other institutions as well. While we have researched how the Commission’s legislative initiatives 
impact lobbying mobilization in the EP we know little of its potential effect in the opposite direction. 
As the EP impacts policy under inter-institutional negotiations (Farrell & Héritier 2007; Häge & 
Kaeding 2007; Häge 2011) one can argue that the EP may also lead to the mobilization of interests in 
other EU institutions through its own initiatives. Significantly, INIs may offer a channel for input 
legitimacy for the entire EU system, guiding public interest mobilization across the board and 
overriding the need for a Council with boosted powers (Scharpf 2009).  Nevertheless, we know little 
about the role of INIs in signalling, or their potential impact on the Commission’s agenda and the 
extent to which other EU institutions welcome this activity (see Naurin & Rasmussen 2011 as an 
exception). Furthermore, we know even less about their cross-institutional impact on interest group 
mobilization. As such, we identify INIs as an understudied area which restricts our understanding of 
interest group mobilization across the EU system and its cross-institutional interactions. Future work 
in this area can enlighten the multi-faceted relationship between institutional interactions and orbiting 
interests.  
The results confirm the existence of a diffuse population of interests (Lehman 2009). 
However, proponents of EU pluralism(s) should consider that the mosaic of the population is largely 
covered by two types of groups; business (companies and associations), and NGOs / CSOs. 
Significantly, the same committee can engage in different functions of authority, which impact the 
mobilization of different interest groups within it. Within this environment, conceptual vehicles need 
to be able to pinpoint drivers of diversity at finer levels of analysis. We find that legitimacy frames, 
whilst operating within a conceptually macro-sphere, almost counter-intuitively, achieve this goal. 
Substantively, they enable us to translate legal-procedural functions into forms of authority. By so 
doing, this paper implements post-modern conceptualizations on a sub-systemic level; we call on 
future research to test its potential cross-institutional value.  On a smaller note, we seem to know 
surprisingly little about the activity of the 3d largest group of interests in the EU, professional 
consultancies. While some work has engaged in examining the biggest clients, future research that 
examines their activity on a per file basis can offer valuable insight into the EU lobbying universe.  
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While this paper addresses interest group diversity with respect to different procedures of the 
EP the principle may apply to other congresses and institutions beyond the EU. As such, a substantial 
body of work has offered significant results in terms of interest group mobilization within institutions 
with respect to legislative activity (Gray et al. 2005; Baumgartner et al. 2009, 2011). The results 
suggest that there is space for further exploration within institutions in terms of procedural variation, 
which could yield interesting results beyond the traditional norms of mobilization-follows-legislation. 
However, this requires that we examine institutional functions beyond the strictly legislative 
procedures of policymaking. 
 
Conclusions  
In this paper, we aimed to assess the diversity of interest group mobilization within the EP’s 
committees. We have identified a clear link between specific procedures and interest group types. The 
EP requires output legitimacy for files under OLP as it scrutinises the policy proposals of the 
Commission whose legislative zeal is tied to producing proposals as an independent actor, limiting 
demand and incentive for public interest mobilization. Inversely, in the case of Own Initiative Reports 
the EP strengthens NGO mobilization as it tries to gather input legitimacy, in an attempt to impact the 
EU agenda and assert its political-representative nature.   
This risks creating a cartel of representation across institutions and within specific file types. 
In policy terms the EP can reduce this issue by encouraging and potentially funding stronger public 
interest participation in OLPs and committees that impact common market policy where the 
Commission is particularly active. Moreover, the EP could increase its output legitimacy and 
overcome part of this bias by strengthening its research capacity to be less dependent on economic 
interests’ inputs. Conversely, economic interests that can bring a wider political perspective should be 
encouraged to participate in INI procedures, while public interests can be encouraged to participate in 
OLP files. In so doing the aggregate legitimacy of the EP could be increased. 
Framing mobilization diversity across sub-systems requires conceptual tools that can model 
permanent institutional traits at fine-grained levels of analysis, and we find that legitimacy arguments 
do so successfully. Ultimately the nature of the interest group and its incentive structure impact the 
legitimacy it carries; as a mirror image, procedures with different functions (OLP and INI) engage in 
different authority functions demanding different types of legitimacy. 
Drawing from our analysis across procedures we find that interest group mobilization in the 
EP is a product of both the Commission’s legislative initiatives and parliamentary initiatives. 
However, it is unclear how these initiatives interplay in lobbying strategies and to what extent they 
impact the mobilization of groups in other EU institutions, specifically in the Commission. Future 
work could examine the potential impact of the EP’s initiatives on interest group activity within it, as 
well as across institutions, as a way of covering what appears to be a large and distinct part of its 
puzzle and the politicization of EU interest group mobilization. Finally, the implications of this paper 
potentially apply beyond the EU; it is possible that interest group diversity is driven by procedural 
variations in other institutions at the national and international level. 
David Coen and Alexander Katsaitis 
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